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This study examines the relation between size of audit firm and audit quality, and the choice of accrual 
measures for a large sample of firms. In relation to the impact of different sizes of audit firms on audit 
quality, a clear majority of oil companies and audit firms agreed that Big Four firms are superior to their 
non-Big Four counterparts in all of the reputation issues presented to them, and that the size of the 
audit firm is positively associated with audit quality. Such superiority is seen in terms of resources and 
audit technology, and the consequent motivation to perform as professionally as possible. A 
questionnaire was used to collect data. To confirm and support the questionnaire findings, semi-
structured interviews were conducted. The data used for this study were collected from two sources: 
the demand side (Libyan oil companies) and the supply side (audit firms working in Libya).  The data for 
the Libyan oil companies were gathered from three different types of respondents: internal auditors, 
financial managers and accounts managers. For the audit firms, data were gathered from employees at 
all levels in the firm: managing partners, audit supervisors and auditors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature indicates that satisfactory levels of audit 
quality are usually more evident in large audit firms than 
in small ones, one reason being that the larger the firm, 
the higher the number of clients, and the greater the 
probability that the range of services provided is bigger. 
This minimises dependency on particular clients 
(Makarem, 2011).  And despite the high-profile lawsuits 
that some big auditing firms have faced in recent years, it 
is argued by Francis (2004) that these firms do, 
nonetheless, provide audits of a higher quality than their 
smaller counterparts. Additionally, large firms have more 
resources and are able to take steps to publicise their 
services and develop a reputation.  As a result of this, 
they are usually considered as providing a high quality 
service, and the size of the audit firm has, therefore, been 
used as a surrogate for audit  quality  (DeAngelo,  1981a;   
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Dehkordi and Makarem, 2011; Francis, 2004; Jeong and 
Rho, 2004; Krishnan, 2005). Large audit firms (the Big 
Four for example) can devote much investment to the 
provision of training courses and other resources 
necessary to ensure their staff are competent, able to 
audit to a high standard, and are less likely to be 
compromised by actions of clients (Francis and Yu, 2009; 
Dopuch, 1984; Gul, 1991; Behn et al. 2008; Wilson and 
Grimlund, 1990; Rusmin, 2010; Lawrence et al, 2011).  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although there are short studies recently dealing with the 
relationship between sizes of firms and audit quality in 
Libya, the topic still raises interest and calls for further 
and more in-depth research. The following provides an 
overview of the key literature in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the topic under consideration. 
A number of reasons  exist to explain the importance of  
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the relationship between firm size and audit quality. One 
of these is the fact that audit firm size is immediately 
observable and can, therefore, be readily used as an 
indicator of audit quality; and another justification is that if 
a positive relationship can indeed be demonstrated 
between size of audit firm and audit quality, then a 
rationale is provided for the demand for continuing 
professional education in all audit firms, irrespective of 
their size. Thirdly, if audit quality and size are shown to 
be related, the structure of liability insurance premiums 
could also be affected (Colbert and Murray, 1998). 
Nevertheless, despite these arguments for the impor-
tance of audit firm size in producing a quality outcome, it 
is nonetheless suggested that audit quality is indepen-
dent of firm size (Arnett and Danos, 1979; Francis, 2004; 
Jeong and Rho, 2004; Krishnan, 2005; Chandler, 1991; 
Lee et al., 2007; Ferguson and Stokes, 2003; Francis and 
Yu, 2009).   
However, audit firms do provide differing quality audits, 
increasing with the size of firms, in response to varying 
demands for quality amongst clients because different 
companies have different levels of agency costs 
(Arrunada, 1999). The extent of the debate on this 
particular issue suggests a difficulty in reaching a policy 
decision on it, and it is argued (Arnett and Danos, 1979; 
Behn et al, 2008) that it is unfair to distinguish between 
large and small audit firms if professional standards and 
qualifications are maintained throughout the sector.  In 
this respect, Arnett and Danos (1979) comment: “If we 
assume that the quality of the auditing is the same 
regardless of the size of the firm performing it, the banker 
would be supplied with the same information on which to 
base his decision; in this way the size of the firm should 
not necessarily be a consideration’’. 
Within the auditing literature, it is firm size that has 
attracted the greatest attention, with the assertion being 
that bigger firms deliver a higher quality audit than their 
smaller counterparts. And many studies have found 
evidence to support the notion that firm size has an 
impact on audit quality, with quality improving as the size 
of the firm increases (DeAngelo, 1981b; Rusmin, 2010; 
Lawrence et al, 2011; Davidson and Neu, 1993; Becker 
et al., 1998; Abu Bakar et al., 2005; Ferguson and Stokes 
2003; Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al, 2010).  
There is reason to believe that one explanation for this 
phenomenon is that bigger firms have more and better 
resources than smaller firms, that they have greater 
research facilities, that they can undertake the strongest 
tests, and that their technological capacity is such that 
they can generally do much more than their smaller 
counterparts (Reisch, 2000). More recently, analyst 
forecast accuracy has been included as a proxy for audit 
quality, by Behn et al (2008), who assert that in the case 
where one category of auditor increases the reporting 
reliability of earnings in comparison to the other type, 
analysts of  the  superior  type  clients  should  be able  to  
 
 
 
 
make more accurate forecasts of future earnings than 
those analysts of the non-superior type clients. Accepting 
this line of argument, it was found by Behn et al. (2008) 
that analysts of Big 4 clients have higher forecast 
accuracy than analysts of non-Big 4 clients.  
Moreover, as noted by DeAngelo (1981b), the larger 
audit firms are not concerned in the same way as are 
smaller firms, with the loss of a client, and hence they 
produce higher audit quality because they are not afraid 
to be objective. Additionally, it is confirmed by Krishnan 
and Schauer (2000), that the degree of compliance 
observed is directly correlated to audit firm size, this 
increasing on a continuum moving from the small non-Big 
Six to the large non-Big Six to the Big Six.  
However, there are many critics of this view and it has 
been argued that high quality corporate reporting is, in 
fact, an outcome of the audit firm’s status (Naser and Al-
Khatib (2000). The large international firms have a 
reputation for disclosing information of a high quality, so 
any audit firm with an affiliation to one of the international 
firms, is automatically elevated in the reputation stakes. 
Clearly, once a reputation has been earned, it must be 
protected, and in the case of audit firms, this is done by 
delivering credible audits on a consistent basis. In a 
recent study by Michael (2007), it was confirmed that the 
clients of large audit firms tend to have lower abnormal 
accruals, and to satisfy the benchmark earnings 
objectives of small profits and small earnings increases, 
than do clients of small audit firms; moreover, large firms 
were found to be more likely to issue going-concern 
reports.  
Such behaviour on the part of large firms testifies to 
their independence, which has been reported in the 
literature, it being noted that Big Four auditors are less 
likely than smaller auditors to provide a personalized 
services approach (McLennan and Park, 2004). The fact 
that larger audit firms have several clients and are not 
reliant upon the revenue from simply one or two leads to 
increased auditor independence, which is a recognized 
principal component of audit quality (Arrunada, 1999; 
Niemi, 2004; Alleyne et al., 2006). Francis and Yu (2009) 
document a systematic association between Big 4 office 
size and audit outcomes consistent with larger offices 
producing higher quality audits. 
Indeed, in their research into forecasted and reported 
earnings, Davidson and Neu (1993) found that firms with 
a reputation for delivering higher audit quality reported 
more forecast errors than audit firms without such 
prestige. Becker et al. (1998) found non-Big Six auditors 
had more discretionary accruals for increasing income 
than Big-Six auditors. Francis et al. (1999) also found that 
aggressive earnings management was much more likely 
to be contained by Big Six auditors than non-Big Six 
firms; and in confirmation of this phenomenon, Davidson 
et al. (2006) reported that the receipt of modified audit 
reports from Big Six auditors  often induces companies to  
  
 
 
 
 
appoint non-Big Six auditors, and that thereafter, they 
report increased levels of earnings management.  
This suggests overwhelmingly, that Big Six auditors are 
much stricter, and provide audits that are much more 
accurate, much more conservative and less optimistic 
than non-Big Six auditors (Lennox, 1999; Gaeremynck 
and Willekens, 2003; Lee and Taylor, 2001). And for 
investors, companies that are audited by the Big Six audit 
firms would seem to be more attractive since there are 
likely to be less unwelcome surprises. Indeed, Hussainey 
(2009) found that the ability of investors to forecast future 
earnings is improved in such a circumstance since any 
going concerns are readily identified. 
Mutchler et al. (1997) confirm that Big Six auditors are 
more likely than their non-Big Six counterparts to issue 
going-concern opinions, suggesting that larger firms are 
prepared to take an aggressive stance in issuing an 
appropriate opinion, that they have better technical ability 
to detect the going-concern issue, or have more clients 
with such issues. Additionally, auditors are less likely to 
issue going-concern modifications to larger companies 
which later go bankrupt, possibly because they are more 
confident that larger companies can sit out their financial 
difficulties, or maybe because they fear that issuing the 
going-concern modification will itself precipitate failure. 
Similarly, Morris and Strawser (1999) assert that banks 
receiving modified audit reports from Big Six audit firms 
were more likely to continue, and not face closure by the 
regulators than those receiving modified audit reports 
from non-Big Six audit firms. In contrast, banks with non-
modified audit reports from non-Big Six audit firms were 
more likely to be closed than those receiving non-
modified audit reports from Big Six audit firms. Hence, 
banks audited by the Big Six are more likely to be 
allowed to continue, consistent with regulators’ 
perceptions that economic reporting incentives may result 
in Big Six audit firms being more likely to modify their 
opinions to reflect going-concern uncertainties.  
O’Keefe and Westort (1992) considered the reasons 
why a positive relationship has been found to exist 
between large firm size and the probability of error 
detection. They identified these as being: firstly, 
personnel in large firms become more specialized, and 
secondly, CPAs in larger firms are involved in signi-
ficantly more continuing professional education than 
CPAs in small firms. Hence, audit teams in big firms are 
expected to have greater technological knowledge than 
those in small firms, and to be more skilled in the 
detection and correction of errors. Indeed, it has been 
argued for some time (see Deis and Giroux, 1992) that 
larger firms have less deficient paperwork than smaller 
firms. 
That said, there has been a line of argument against 
the idea that accounting quality is a product of audit firm 
size, with Imhoff (1988) asserting that no such difference 
occurs,   and   Chandler   (1991)   arguing  that  quality  is  
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produced by individual auditors rather than the firms for 
which they work. And Lee et al. (2007) go so far as to say 
that there is no quality advantage in big audit firms 
because they face less of a litigation risk than smaller 
firms, and because they are involved in the provision of 
non-audit services as well, which often creates very 
special relationships with particular clients. 
Offering a different viewpoint on the relationship 
between firm size and audit quality, Dopuch and Simunic 
(1980) argue that product-differentiation theory can 
explain many of the apparent monopolistic characteristics 
of the industry. They suggest that different auditing firms 
are perceived by investors to offer auditing services that 
are qualitatively different, and specifically the former Big 
Eight are considered to be more credible than other 
auditing companies. Dopuch and Simunic (1980) con-
sider audit quality to result from the number and extent of 
audit procedures performed by the auditor, and this in 
turn relates to the resources available to audit firms, 
since these may allow for more powerful tests to be 
performed. In order to test this hypothesis, Nichols and 
Smith (1983), using a market model methodology on 
event studies, examined whether positive abnormal 
returns accrue to organizations that move from being 
audited by non-Big Eight to Big Eight auditors, and also 
whether negative abnormal returns accrue to firms which 
move in the opposite direction. They found an apparent 
positive, but not statistically significant, reaction from the 
market, and consequently did not offer strong support for 
the Dopuch and Simunic (1980)’s argument. In fact, it has 
not been determined whether this disagreement comes 
from a weakness in the model, or its application by 
Nichols and Smith (1983).  
Choi et al (2010) show that office size has significantly 
positive relations with both audit quality and fees, after 
analyzing national-level audit firm size and office-level 
industry expertise. These positive relations support the 
view that large local offices provide higher-quality audits 
compared to small local offices, and that such quality 
differences are priced in the market for audit services. 
In contrast, Knapp (1991), investigating the effect of 
key audit variables on the assessments of audit quality of 
a sample of audit committee members, found no 
significant effect of audit size on the discovery 
assessments, although there was more probability of 
disclosure among the Big Eight.  
Research by Krishnan and Schauer (2000) found a 
relationship between a firm’s participation in a peer-
review process, and financial disclosures, which were 
more likely to be made when such a review was in place. 
The reason is that large audit firms are often in 
partnership with others and each partner is liable for the 
firm’s debt, so peer-review monitoring is required to 
protect all parties’ reputations and financial standing 
(Watts and Zimmerma,, 1986), and according to Beattie 
et   al.  (2001),  to  stand  as  an  additional  guarantee  of  
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auditor independence. Some large audit firms also 
establish their own internal quality review. In the UK, 
independent units, such as the Joint Monitoring Unit 
(JMU) and the ACCA monitoring unit are responsible for 
reviewing the audit quality of audit professionals. 
Colbert and Murray (1998) contribute to the literature, 
which concentrates mainly on the larger audit firms, by 
conducting research with a nationwide sample of 422 
small firms selected from the Private Companies Practice 
Section (PCPS), the Peer Review Programme (PRP), 
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA 1992, 2002), which provides comprehensive 
measures of audit firm quality. They found a positive 
association between firm size and audit quality in firms 
that perform audits, reviews, and compilations (but not in 
firms that perform reviews and compilations, without 
audits). Hence, audit firm size is only a useful quality 
surrogate for firms that conduct audits. 
On a similar theme, Krishnan and Schauer (2000) 
examined the relationship between firm size and audit 
quality in a sample of 164 Voluntary Health and Welfare 
Organizations (VHWOs), using their compliance with 
eight Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs) 
disclosure requirements as the audit quality measure. 
Investments, valuation of fixed assets, form of audit 
report, cash donations and pledges, donated materials 
and services, presentation of statement of functional 
expenses, presentation of balance sheet and other 
statements were the principles. The auditors were 
considered as three groups: the Big Six, large non-Big 
Six, and small non-Big Six. It was found that the extent of 
compliance increased as organizations moved from small 
non-Big Six to large non-Big Six and from large non-Big 
Six to the Big Six. Furthermore, other influential factors in 
respect of audit quality were identified, these being client 
size and financial health, which had a positive 
relationship, and client wealth which had a negative 
impact on audit quality. Geiger et al. (2006b) observe that 
when compared with non-Big Four firms, Big Four firms 
significantly reduce their issuance of going-concern 
modifications to bankruptcy clients after the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, suggesting lower quality 
reporting for Big Four firms.     
In a more recent study, Chung and Kallapur (2003) 
found that incentives offered to auditors definitely 
compromised their independence. This issue was related 
to client importance and was based on the economic 
theory of auditor’s independence. They used ratios of 
client fees and NAS fees divided by audit firms’ US 
revenues as surrogates for audit practice, business reve-
nues and measure of client importance, and examined 
the association with abnormal accruals in the Jones 
Model using a sample of 1,871 clients of Big Five audit 
firms. No statistical association was reported between 
client importance ratios and abnormal accruals in part of 
the sample based  on  size,  and  client  opportunities,  as  
 
 
 
 
proxies by business and geographical segment 
diversification. In another study in a similar context, 
Krishnan (2003) explored the relationship between audit 
quality and pricing of discretionary accruals, finding that 
Big Six clients report lower amounts of discretionary 
accruals than non-Big Six clients, and the relationship 
between stock returns and discretionary accruals is 
greater for firms audited by Big Six auditors than for 
those audited by non-Big Six auditors. Furthermore, the 
discretionary accruals of Big Six auditors’ clients have a 
greater association with future profitability than those of 
non-Big Six auditors. And finally, the stock market 
acknowledges the superiority of Big Six auditors to non-
Big Six auditors only for discretionary accruals. Overall, 
the outcomes of Krishnan’s (2003) study are consistent 
with the idea that higher audit quality is associated with 
Big Six auditors, and this is reflected in the security 
returns of the clients of Big Six auditors.   
In recent research, Choi et al. (2008) indicated that a 
fee premium is charged by large audit firms because they 
face higher legal liability costs, and hence, have more 
incentive to make a better effort than smaller firms. These 
researchers suggest that the fee premium decreases as 
the legal regime becomes stronger because small 
auditors have a higher audit failure rate than Big Four 
auditors, and increase audit fees significantly more to 
compensate for their increase in legal liability costs. 
The literature on firm size has clearly highlighted that 
whilst different samples and methods have been used by 
different researchers, there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and audit quality. Specifically, large 
audit firms have more resources which they can direct to 
the recruitment and training process, thereby providing 
them with the human capability to detect and correct 
errors in financial statements. Moreover, as larger audit 
firms have reputations to preserve, they are careful to 
report deficiencies. That said, many of the differences 
between large and small firms should be eliminated by 
the maintenance of professional standards and qualifi-
cations, and a more efficient regulatory framework. 
Nonetheless, the literature does show that some 
studies have not found a relationship between audit firm 
size and measures of quality. In 1988, Imhoff surveyed 
financial analysts, finding that they saw no difference in 
quality between Big Eight and other audit firms. Likewise, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA 1992, 2002) argued that audit quality is indepen-
dent of firm size. Additionally, Chandler (1991) found 
audit quality to be a feature of particular auditors, and not 
firms. All Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) meet the 
same exacting standards for admission to the profession 
and participate in professional education annually 
(AICPA, 2002). Moreover, all AICPA members are subject 
to three-yearly external review of their auditing practice 
(AICPA. 1992).  And, the collapse of Arthur Andersen 
and the opposition to peer review in large audit  firms,  as  
  
 
 
 
 
found by Fearnley et al. (2005), would seem to indicate 
that it is individuals who are responsible for providing 
audit quality rather than audit firms. 
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) introduced 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) as a monitor for auditor professionalism, and as 
a replacement for the peer review system because of 
anxieties concerning the potential for compromising 
quality control among peers. Krishnan (2005) has 
consistently argued that audit quality differs between and 
within audit firms. Hence, it is wrong to attribute audit 
quality to firms on the basis of their size, irrespective of 
the fact that larger firms have more resources. Given the 
stage in Libya’s development, no consensus has yet 
been reached on this issue. 
 
 
METHODS AND THE SAMPLING UNIT  
 
A mixed methods approach was utilised in this study to gather a 
range of views from all the professional groups involved in Libyan 
auditing. Questionnaires were used to collect data concerning the 
perceptions of two sources: the demand side (Libyan oil com-
panies) and the supply side (audit firms working in Libya).  The data 
for the Libyan oil companies were gathered from three different 
types of respondents: internal auditors, financial managers and 
accounts managers. The reason for choosing these three groups of 
respondents, rather than other employees in the company, was the 
fact that the literature of auditing indicates that the external auditor 
usually has more contact with these groups than any others. For 
the audit firms, data were gathered from employees at all levels in 
the audit firm: managing partners, audit supervisors and auditors.   
The rationale for choosing oil companies was because of their 
high level of organisation and the fact that most of these companies 
employ personnel who hold degrees from the United States or 
Britain – these two facts enabled the researcher to access the right 
people and obtain the appropriate data. 
The magnitude of the activities of the oil companies, and hence 
the scale of the accounting systems, represent an attraction for 
large numbers of qualified accountants, who hold qualifications and 
different accounting backgrounds, a fact that allowed the 
researcher to have access to a large community of accountants, 
with diverse careers and work experience. 
In order to refute and support the questionnaire findings, semi- 
structured interviews were conducted. The sample for the 
interviews was broadly similar to the sample for the questionnaire, 
which involved representatives from Libyan oil companies, namely, 
internal auditors, financial managers, accounts managers, and 
representatives from audit firms working in Libya, namely, mana-
ging partners, auditors and audit supervisors. Regulators working in 
the LAAA were also included in the interviewee sample, partly due 
to the fact that, after analysing the questionnaire survey, the 
researcher found it necessary to interview regulators to clarify some 
grey areas found in the analysis, and more importantly, to 
triangulate the sample of the study and to obtain different opinions 
from different dimensions. The total number of interviews conducted 
with the oil companies was ten (three with internal auditors, four 
with financial managers, and three with accounts managers), and 
the total number of interviews conducted with the audit firms 
working in Libya was thirteen (four with managing partners, six with 
audit supervisors, and three with auditors).  Lastly, two interviews 
were conducted with regulators working for the LAAA. This process 
aimed   to   enhance   and  supplement  the  questionnaire  findings  
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providing an in-depth clarification and understanding of the effects 
that the selected factors have on evidence obtained by Libyan 
auditors. Content analysis was used to analyse the data collected in 
the interviews.   
The first part of the questionnaire was designed to obtain the 
views of external, internal, state and taxation auditors relating to the 
effects of the professional and academic qualifications of the 
auditor on quality of evidence. The second section aimed to gather 
the participant’s opinions regarding the effects of the consistency of 
evidence on audit evidence. The final section asked the participants 
about the effects of the amount of evidence on quality of evidence.  
A 5-point Likert-scale ranging from strongly undermines evidence 
to strongly enhances evidence was utilised to measure perceptions 
regarding quality of audit evidence (Saunders et al., 2007).  
For the purpose of this study, 147 questionnaires were distri-
buted to the oil companies. Of these, 52 went to internal auditors, 
50 to financial managers, and 45 to accounts managers. 
Additionally, 300 questionnaires were sent to the audit firms 
working in Libya, 100 to managing partners, 100 to audit super-
visors, and 100 to auditors. The samples from the demand side 
(internal auditors, financial managers and accounts managers) 
represent the agent of the principal, and conduct business on 
behalf of the principal. Hence, a monitoring mechanism is needed 
to assess their performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The 
samples from the supply side (managing partners, audit supervisors 
and auditors) represent the main subjects of the issue of interest 
that provide certification and/or information credibility assessment to 
the stakeholders (Humphrey, 1997). Hasan (2000) points out that 
audit firms and their clients evaluate audit quality in different ways, 
and it was, therefore important to receive responses from both 
sections of the research population.  
Considerable effort was made in order to avoid problems of non-
response and to ensure the completeness of the questionnaire that 
was designed using mainly closed questions which are easy for 
respondents to answer. The questionnaire sample consisted of all 
listed oil companies in the NOC and 100 audit firms working in 
Libya. The wording of the questionnaire was clear and straight-
forward, the instrument was of a reasonable length, and there were 
no complaints about layout. Most of the questionnaires were 
personally administered (Managing Partner - 52 questionnaires; 
Audit Supervisor - 52 questionnaires; Auditor - 56 questionnaires; 
Internal Auditor - 45 questionnaires; Financial Manager - 47 
questionnaires; and Accounts Manager - 35 questionnaires), and 
some questionnaires were delivered personally by the researcher 
and returned by mail.  
The overall response rate to the questionnaire was extremely 
encouraging at 64% (Table 1). Remenyi et al. (2002) suggest that a 
response rate above 60% is considered to be exemplary. The 
response rates for internal auditors and financial managers were 
86.5 and 94% respectively, higher than those of accounts 
managers, managing partners, and audit supervisors, which were 
77.7, 52 and 52%, respectively. Some were unable to complete the 
questionnaires, and the researcher was unable to contact 
respondents outside Tripoli because of poor communication 
facilities, including the official postal system. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Quantitative findings 
 
In order to elicit their perceptions of the relationship 
between audit firm size and audit quality, respondents 
from oil companies and audit firms were asked to indicate 
on  a  scale  ranging  from  1  -  strongly  disagree,  to  5 - 
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strongly agree, their disagreement or agreement with the 
five statements given in Table 2. 
The statement The Big Four firms are more risk averse 
in respect of damage to their reputation from public 
scandals and/or audit failures had the highest mean 
score (3.93), resulting from 70.1% of oil company 
respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. The 
statement The local audit firms achieve a lower level of 
audit quality had the second highest mean score (3.91) 
with as many as 71.6% of oil company respondents 
agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
The statement The companies audited by the Big Four 
firms are more attractive to investors and creditors had 
the third highest mean score (3.77) based on the 
responses from oil company participants. As many as 
63.8% either agreed or strongly agreed with this 
statement. The statement The Big Four Firms achieve a 
high level of audit quality had the fourth highest mean 
score (3.75), with 70.9% of respondents agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with it. The statements The Big Four 
firms perform more powerful, effective tests and are more 
credible than others and the size of the audit firm is 
positively associated with audit quality had the fifth 
highest mean scores (3.65 and 3.63), with 69.3 and 
64.6% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with 
them, respectively. 
As many as 66.1 and 63.8% of respondents either 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statements The Big 
Four firms can plan the audit process more effectively 
and can obtain a greater variety of clients and the Big 
Four firms are more independent and more likely to issue 
qualified reports. These statements achieved nearly the 
same mean scores (3.58 and 3.57). The Statement The 
Big Four firms can report the real financial situation of the 
clients more readily than other firms had the lowest mean 
score (3.49).  
In the responses from audit firm representatives, the 
statement The local audit firms achieve a lower level of 
audit quality had the highest mean score (3.96), with 
70.7% of audit firm respondents supporting it. The 
statements that The size of the audit firm is positively 
associated with audit quality, The Big Four firms achieve 
a high level of audit quality and The companies audited 
by the Big Four firms are more attractive to investors and 
creditors had the second highest and same mean score 
(3.78), with as many as 66.9, 63.8 and 68.1% of 
respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with 
them, respectively. The statement that The Big Four firms 
perform more powerful, effective tests and are more 
credible than others had the third highest mean score 
(3.71), with 61.9% of respondents either agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with it. The statement that The Big Four 
firms are more risk averse in respect of damage to their 
reputation from public scandals and/or audit failures had 
the fourth highest mean score (3.70), with 63.2% of 
respondents either agreeing or strongly  agreeing  with  it. 
 
 
 
 
The statement that The Big Four firms can plan the audit 
process more effectively and can obtain a greater variety 
of clients had the fifth highest mean score (3.66) with as 
many as 62.8% of respondents either agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with it. 
The statement that The Big Four firms can report the 
real financial situation of the clients more readily than 
other firms had the second lowest mean score (3.61), 
with as many as 57.8% of respondents either agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with it. 
The statement that The Big Four firms are more 
independent and more likely to issue qualified reports 
had the lowest mean score (3.11), with 48.8% of 
respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
Once again, because the overall responses of oil 
companies and audit firms’ respondents were not com-
pletely homogeneous, an attempt was made to isolate 
the determinants of responses. 
The analysis of differences between oil companies’ and 
audit firms’ responses is reported in Table 2, which 
reveals one significant difference at the 1% level and one 
at the 5%, as measured by the Mann Whitney U test. 
An inspection of each sample group’s distribution of 
responses (which is reflected in the mean scores) shows 
a significant difference at the 1% level of significance 
between oil companies’ and audit firms’ respondents for 
one of the nine statements, and a significant difference at 
the 5% level for another one of the nine statements, 
using the Mann Whitney U test. These findings suggest 
that oil companies’ respondents perceived the Big Four 
as producing a higher level of audit quality than non-Big 
Four audit firms. The Big Four firms are more risk averse 
in respect of damage to their reputation from public 
scandals and/or audit failures, and that the Big Four firms 
are more independent and more likely to issue qualified 
reports, which is consistent with the findings of Michael 
(2007) who determined that clients audited by large audit 
firms tend to have lower unusual accruals, and are more 
likely to meet the benchmark earnings targets of small 
earnings increases. He also found that large audit firms 
are more likely to issue going-concern reports. These 
results show that there is a significant variation in audit 
quality across different sizes of auditor practice offices, 
with larger offices providing higher quality audits. They 
are consistent with the conclusions drawn by Beatty 
(1989) and Titman and Trueman (1986) that since large 
audit firms (Big Four) have greater resources and 
possess identical technological capabilities, they are 
capable of performing more powerful tests. As a result, 
larger audit firms are more likely to be associated with 
more precise information than smaller audit firms.  
 
 
The perceptions of size of audit firms based on 
position  
 
Table 3 presents the analysis by position. Distributions  of 
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Table 1. Questionnaire survey response rate. 
 
Group Distributed 
questionnaires 
Useable   
questionnaires 
Response 
rate 
Managing partner 100 52 52 
Audit supervisor 100 52 52 
Auditor 100 56 56 
Internal auditor 52 45 86.5 
Financial manager 50 47 94 
Accounts manager 45 35 77.7 
Total 447 287 64 
 
 
 
the responses from oil company staff and audit firm staff 
were significantly different at the 1% and 5% level, as 
measured by the Kruskal-Wallis statistic.  
Overall perceptions of respondents showed one 
significant difference in the distribution of responses at 
the 1% level of significance as measured by the Kruskal 
Wallis test. Auditors had a significantly lower mean score 
(2.5) and accounts managers and financial managers 
had the highest mean score (4.26 and 3.49) for the 
statement The Big Four firms are more independent and 
more likely to issue qualified reports. This difference in 
the responses perhaps indicates that the oil company’s 
respondents believe large firms are wealthier than small 
firms and would potentially be required to give in to larger 
claims in the event that they were to be sued. Hence, 
they might be more concerned about maintaining audit 
quality and their reputation in the audit market than 
smaller firms. The result might also explain why the Big 
Four have been reported as providing higher quality 
auditing and being more independent than non-Big Four 
firms in the literature (Michael, 2007; Becker et al., 1998; 
Francis et al., 1999; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; 
Dehkordi and Makarem, 2011; Francis, 2004; Jeong and 
Rho, 2004; Krishnan, 2005). 
 
 
The perceptions of size of audit firm based on type of 
audit firm  
 
The analysis by type of audit firm, as reported in Table 4, 
shows five significant differences between local audit 
firms, Arab or international firms, and local firms affiliated 
to one of the Big Four audit firms (non-Big Four and Big 
Four) at the 1 and 5% levels of significance, respectively, 
as measured by the Kruskal-Wallis test. The level of 
agreement with the statements The companies audited 
by the Big firms are more attractive to investors and 
creditors and The Big Four firms are more independent 
and more likely to issue qualified reports at the level of1% 
of significance was significantly higher for Big Four 
respondents (4.33 and 3.86, mean score, respectively) 
than for local, Arab, and international audit firm’s (non-Big 
Four) respondents (3.83, 2.9 and 3.37, 3.21, respec-
tively). This outcome is consistent with the study 
conducted by Michael (2007) who found that clients 
audited by large audit firms tend to have lower unusual 
accruals, and are more likely to meet the benchmark 
earnings targets of small earnings increases. 
In addition, the analysis by type of audit firm in Table 4 
shows three significant differences between local audit 
firms, local firms affiliated to an Arab or international audit 
firm, and local firms affiliated to one of the Big Four audit 
firms, (non-Big Four and Big Four) at the 5% level of 
significance, as measured by the Kruskal-Wallis test. The 
level of agreement with these three statements by Big 
Four audit firms’ respondents was significantly higher 
than it was by non-Big Four audit firms’ respondents. This 
disagreement in the responses from the Big Four audit 
firms’ respondents perhaps indicates the main reasons 
why, in their view, the Big Four are perceived as 
producing a higher level of audit quality than the non-Big 
Four. The reasons may be summarised as follows:  
 
1. The Big Four firms are more independent and more 
likely to issue qualified reports. 
2. The Big Four firms can report the real financial 
situation of the clients more readily than other firms. 
3. The Big Four firms perform more powerful, effective 
tests and are more credible than others. The Big  Four  
firms  can  plan  the  audit  process more effectively and 
can obtain  a  greater  variety of clients. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that these results strongly 
support previous studies, such as the one undertaken by 
De Angelo (1981a) who argued that audit quality is 
directly related to the size of auditing firm, that conducted 
by Dopuch and Simunic (1980) who reported that the Big 
Four are perceived as providing a higher level of audit 
quality than non-Big Four auditors because they are 
viewed as being more credible and have more resources, 
and the research by Morris and Strawser (1999) that 
found that banks receiving modified  audit  reports  from  
Big  Six  audit  firms were more likely to continue, and not 
be   closed   by   the   regulators,   than   those   receiving  
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Table 2. Distribution of the evaluations given by the different statements regarding the size of audit firm and audit quality.  
 
Statement 
Audit firms Oil companies Sig 
SD 
% 
D 
% 
NV 
% 
A 
% 
SA 
% 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
SD 
% 
D 
% 
NV 
% 
A 
% 
SA 
% 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
The size of the audit firm is positively associated with audit 
quality. 
5.6 7.5 20 37.5 29.4 3.78 4.00 10.2 13.4 11.8 32.3 32.3 3.63 4.00  
                
The Big Four firms can report the real financial situation of 
the clients more readily than other firms. 
6.3 10.6 25.6 30.6 26.9 3.61 4.00 10.2 12.6 22.8 26.8 27.6 3.49 4.00  
                
The Big Four firms are more risk averse in respect of 
damage to their reputation from public scandals and/or 
audit failures. 
2.5 11.9 22.5 39.4 23.8 3.70 4.00 3.1 9.4 17.3 31.5 38.6 3.93 4.00 ** 
                
The Big Four firms perform more powerful, effective tests 
and are more credible than others 
8.1 10 20 26.3 35.6 3.71 4.00 15 11.8 3.9 32.3 37 3.65 4.00  
                
The Big Four Firms achieve a high level of audit quality 5.6 11.3 19.4 27.5 36.3 3.78 4.00 10.2 7.9 11 38.6 32.3 3.75 4.00  
The local audit firms achieve a lower level of audit quality 3.8 6.9 18.8 31.3 39.4 3.96 4.00 3.9 9.4 15 35.4 36.2 3.91 4.00  
The companies audited by the Big firms are more attractive 
to investors and creditors. 
6.3 8.1 17.5 38.1 30 3.78 4.00 3.9 7.9 26 33.1 30.7 3.77 4.00 
 
                
The Big Four firms can plan the audit process more 
effectively and can obtain a greater variety of clients. 
5.6 13.8 18.1 33.8 28.8 3.66 4.00 7.9 11 21 34.6 25.2 3.58 4.00 
 
                
The Big Four firms are more independent and more likely to 
issue qualified reports 
18.1 15.2 21.3 27.5 17.5 3.11 3.00 9.4 11 18.9 34.6 26 3.57 4.00 * 
 
*,** indicates distribution of responses is significantly different at the 1%, 5% levels, respectively using the Mann Whitney U test. 
 
 
 
modified audit reports from non-Big Six audit 
firms. In contrast,banks receiving non-modified 
audit reports from non-Big Six (as the Big Four 
were then) audit firms were more likely to be 
closed than those receiving non-modified audit 
reports from Big Six audit firms. Overall, 
respondents’ perceptions of the relationship 
between firm size and level of audit quality are 
consistent with the notion that higher audit quality 
is associated with the Big Four audit firms. 
Qualitative findings 
 
Audit firm size has been used as  a  surrogate  for  
audit quality in prior literature (DeAngelo, 1981a). 
Moreover, prior research (Becker et al., 1998; 
Francis et al., 1999) has reported that Big Four 
audit clients present lower discretionary accruals 
than those of non-Big Four firms because Big 
Four auditors may have more expertise, resis-
tance to clients’ discretion, and awareness of 
financial and reputation loss, than non-Big Four 
auditors. Therefore, this section aims to demon-
strate whether the size of the audit firm affects 
audit quality in Libya, and to identify reasons for 
possible quality difference by firm size.  
The majority of interviewees (88% of oil com-
panies and audit firms) agreed that the size of 
audit firms does indicate different levels of audit 
quality, and that they believe the Big Four audit 
firms    to   be    more    powerful,    effective    and 
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Table 3. Distribution of different statements regarding the size of audit firm based on position. 
 
Statement 
Audit firm staff Oil company staff  
Managing 
partner 
Audit 
supervisor 
Auditor Internal auditor 
Financial 
manager 
Accounts 
manager 
Sig Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
The size of the audit firm is positively 
associated with audit quality. 
3.88 4.00 3.62 4.00 3.82 4.00 3.58 4.00 3.64 4.00 3.69 4.00  
              
The Big Four firms can report the real 
financial situation of the clients more readily 
than other firms. 
3.67 4.00 3.44 400 3.71 4.00 3.58 4.00 3.30 3.00 3.63 4.00  
              
The Big Four firms are more risk averse in 
respect of damage to their reputation from 
public scandals and/or audit failures. 
3.90 4.00 3.67 4.00 3.45 4.00 3.91 4.00 3.77 4.00 4.17 4.00  
              
The Big Four firms perform more powerful, 
effective tests and are more credible than 
others 
3.63 4.00 4.10 4.00 3.43 3.00 3.42 3.00 3.62 4.00 3.97 4.00  
              
The Big Four Firms achieve a high level of 
audit quality. 
3.92 4.00 3.71 4.00 3.70 4.00 3.84 4.00 3.51 4.00 3.94 4.00  
              
The local audit firms achieve a lower level of 
audit quality. 
4.08 4.00 3.63 4.00 4.14 4.00 3.73 3.00 3.83 4.00 4.23 3.00  
              
The companies audited by the Big firms are 
more attractive to investors and creditors. 
3.73 4.00 3.65 4.00 3.93 4.00 3.62 4.00 3.91 4.00 3.77 4.00  
              
The Big Four firms can plan the audit 
process more effectively and can obtain a 
greater variety of clients. 
3.58 4.00 3.62 4.00 3.79 4.00 3.78 4.00 3.53 4.00 3.40 3.00  
              
The Big Four firms are more independent 
and more likely to issue qualified reports 
3.40 4.00 3.42 4.00 2.54 2.50 3.11 3.00 3.49 4.00 4.26 4.00 * 
 
*,** indicates distribution of responses is significantly different at the 1%, 5% levels, respectively using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
 
 
independent than the non-Big Four firms. This 
finding confirms the questionnaire responses 
which showed that 69.3% of oil companies, and 
61.9% of audit firms agreed that the Big Four 
firms perform more powerful and effective tests, 
and are consequently, more credible than other 
firms. 
More   than  three-quarters  of  the  interviewees  
(76%) believed that the level of audit quality in 
Libya depends upon the status of the audit firm, 
example, local audit firm affiliated to a foreign 
audit firm, and again, this confirmed the  question-
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Table 4. Distribution of different statements regarding the size of audit firm based on type of audit firm. 
 
Statement 
Local 
audit firm 
International 
audit firm 
Big Four 
audit firm 
Sig Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
The size of the audit firm is positively associated with audit quality. 3.71 4.00 3.72 4.00 4.19 5.00  
The Big Four firms can report the real financial situation of the clients 
more readily than other firms. 
3.67 4.00 3.35 4.00 3.90 4.00  
        
The Big Four firms are more risk averse in respect of damage to their 
reputation from public scandals and/or audit failures. 
3.71 4.00 3.44 4.00 4.19 4.00 ** 
        
The Big Four firms perform more powerful, effective tests and are more 
credible than others. 
3.73 4.00 3.42 4.00 4.24 5.00 ** 
        
The Big Four Firms achieve a high level of audit quality 3.79 4.00 3.44 4.00 4.38 5.00 ** 
The local audit firms achieve a lower level of audit quality 3.89 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.19 4.00  
The companies audited by the Big firms are more attractive to investors 
and creditors. 
3.83 4.00 3.37 4.00 4.33 4.00 * 
        
The Big Four firms can plan the audit process more effectively and can 
obtain a greater variety of clients. 
3.71 4.00 3.58 4.00 3.62 4.00  
        
The Big Four firms are more independent and more likely to issue 
qualified reports 
2.90 3.00 3.21 3.00 3.86 4.00 * 
 
*,** indicates distribution of responses is significantly different at the 1%, 5% levels, respectively using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
 
 
naire survey results, which showed that more than 
half of the oil company and audit firms’ respon-
dents (66.9 and 59.4%, respectively) similarly 
agreed this was the case. 
The interviews indicated that Big Four firms are 
more structured in terms of staff training, technical 
support, and have wider resources than their 
counterparts in smaller audit firms. This is 
consistent with GAO (2003a), Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961) and Niemi (2004). It was pointed out that 
because of the greater availability of resources, 
the Big Four firms are able to employ more upright 
indivi-duals who have better qualifications and 
background. The quality of people is clearly 
influential on the quality of the service they 
provide, and well-qualified personnel have a 
positive impact on the audit process, since their 
professionalism motivates them to comply with 
accounting standards and codes of ethics and not 
to concur with irregularities in clients’ accounts. 
This result confirms the questionnaire that 66.1% 
of oil companies and 62.8% of audit firms believed 
that the Big Four firms are more likely to issue 
qualified reports and to plan the audit process 
more effectively, thereby obtaining a greater 
variety of clients, and in consequence, being  able  
to provide their audit staff with greater experience.  
In addition, the interviews indicated that the Big  
Four firms are also in a position to offer job 
security, which makes their staff more confident in 
their work and in reporting their results. Therefore, 
they are better able to fight against management 
pressure.  
On this issue, an auditor in one of Big Four audit 
firms remarked: 
 
If it is a Big Four firm, I would have more 
confidence. There is a greater spread of expertise 
and there  is  less  likely  to  be  an  independence  
  
 
 
 
 
problem whereas with a smaller audit firm, they may be 
more dependent on one audit. 
 
This result confirms the questionnaire finding in respect 
of the statement The companies audited by the Big Four 
are more attractive to investors and creditors which had a 
high mean score (3.77 and 3.78), resulting from 63.8 and 
68.1% of oil companies’ and audit firms’ respondents 
agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. This result might 
also explain why Big Four auditors have been reported as 
providing higher quality auditing than non-Big Four 
auditors in prior literature (Dehkordi and Makarem, 2011; 
Francis, 2004; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; 
Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Teoh and Wong, 1993; 
Niemi, 2004; Francis and Yu, 2009).  
On this issue of the external perception of audit firm size, 
a financial manager in an oil company remarked:    
 
There is a greater opportunity to influence a smaller 
practice than a larger practice because the latter is very 
well organised and has its own structures in place. A 
small firm won’t have the same resources and will 
depend on individuals within the practice to try and bring 
the same checks and balances which a large firm, by 
having the structures in place, can automatically impose. 
 
As Big Four audit firms have many audit clients, they 
might not be economically dependent on just a few of 
them. In addition, large firms have more wealth to pay 
larger potential claims if sued, than smaller firms 
(Simunic and Stein, 1996) and so, might be more 
concerned about maintaining audit quality and their 
reputation in the audit market than smaller firms. In 
addition, large size companies with good accounting 
systems and less earnings manipulation might possibly 
hire Big Four auditors because they might be concerned 
about the quality of their financial statement quality and 
the reputation of their companies. Therefore, they might 
select Big Four audit firms to signal a positive company 
image to the public (Chung and Kallapur, 2003). 
An accounts manager in an oil company remarked: 
 
I wouldn’t necessarily be comfortable that the smaller 
audit firms would have the procedures or methodologies 
that the Big Four would have. 
 
In addition, the interviewees disclosed that the Big Four 
firms have adequate resources and the financial ability to 
train their staff in related areas. Indeed, all of the Big Four 
firms encourage their staff to pursue professional qualifi-
cations by giving the appropriate support, such as study 
leave under the ‘article-ship’ scheme. Over the study 
period, personnel are given flexibility to attend classes 
and examinations, whereas many of the small and 
medium firms are unable to offer similar schemes. Thus, 
the interviewees  indicated  that  staff  from  the Big  Four  
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firms are more loyal to, and honest with, their employers, 
and more able to resist clients’ pressure than their 
counterparts from local audit firms. Furthermore, the 
knowledge gained from the training given makes the Big 
Four staff members more skilful and effective in terms of 
diagnosing activities that are inconsistent with clients’ 
going-concern status. 
An internal auditor in one of the oil companies raised the 
issue of greater objectivity, saying: 
 
The Big Four are part of international groups which are 
obliged to satisfy international standards. The smaller 
firms don’t have such ties, reporting structures or quality 
standards. The Big Four are less likely to give a 
personalised approach to their clients. 
 
The majority of the interviewees (84% overall) believed 
that the foreign audit firms’ claim that they provide a 
higher level of audit quality is due to their good 
international reputation, and their well-known brand 
names. It was pointed out that a large majority of the oil 
companies still prefer to engage the Big Four firms as 
their auditors, a preference which portrays that their 
financial reporting is consistent with global standards. 
Indeed, some companies that operate internationally 
associate themselves with reputable auditors to ease 
their dealing with foreign investors and companies. The 
interviews revealed that their foreign associates would 
always assess the credibility of their financial statements 
by reference to the auditor’s name.  
The importance of the auditor being known to be 
credible was raised by a managing partner in one of the 
Big Four audit firms who commented: 
 
In the bigger audit firms you would find a huge diversity of 
clients whereas in the smaller audit firms, you may find 
that the auditor is a close friend of the company. 
 
According to a Big Four managing partner: 
 
The Big Four firms’ auditors are able to maintain a higher 
level of audit quality, possibly due to their organisational 
structure, technology and competency.  
 
Also, the interviewees commented on the fact that the Big 
Four firms have larger customer portfolios as compared 
to their counterparts in small firms, which means that they 
do not have to rely on any single customer. Thus, they 
are better placed to resist management pressure in 
situations of conflict and more able to report any negative 
findings. Small audit firms, on the other hand, have 
limited customer portfolios as pointed out by Pearson 
(1980a), and the termination of any audit job could affect 
their financial position. Interviewees did reveal that small 
audit firms might easily compromise with clients in order 
to retain them. In relation to the size of customer portfolio, 
one audit supervisor from a Big Four firm noted:  
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The Big Four can afford to lose customers, are more 
flexible and more powerful than small firms, and they 
want to keep the major companies such as oil 
companies. 
 
On the other hand, a small minority of the interviewees 
disagreed that audit quality differs according to the size of 
audit firms. These participants believed this to be a mis-
conception that comes from the clients’ management, as 
a result of clients attempting to boost their reporting 
image by associating with audit firms that have a good 
reputation. It may be the case that the management does 
not have confidence in the company’s reporting practices, 
and tries to find an easy way to divert the audience’s 
attention by employing an international audit firm. It was 
pointed out that the differentiation is only to meet the 
consumers’ requirements. The small firms’ ability is in 
question simply because they are not being tested. 
Commenting on the difference between the Big Four and 
non-Big Four firms, an auditor of a local audit firm 
believed that the quality of Big Four and non-Big Four 
auditors in Libya did not significantly differ because it 
depended on individual competence and attitude rather 
than firm size. He said: 
 
In my opinion, the quality of Big Four and non-Big Four 
auditors in Libya does not differ since I believe that their 
quality depends on individual competence and attitude 
Size does not matter. However, auditors in Big Four firms 
have advantages from international working systems and 
quality control, so people may have stereotyped image of 
Big Four quality without considering individual 
competency. 
 
However, a chief internal auditor from a large oil 
company disagreed with this view, arguing that: 
 
The quality of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors differs 
because Big Four firms have more hi-tech resources. 
They hire competent staff and provide them with good 
training courses in order to render good services to their 
clients. Moreover, audit clients come from different 
groups. Big Four clients are large listed companies with 
higher audit fee whereas non-Big Four clients are small 
or medium size companies with lower fee. These 
differences contribute to differences in audit quality. 
 
Considering all the responses from the interviewees, it 
seems obvious that the Big Four audit firms have more 
resources at their disposal, and are able to offer better 
on-going training to their staff.  This appears to be 
understood in the marketplace and associated with a 
better quality service, as also is the non-reliance on 
clients to the same extent that smaller firms who have 
less of a reputation are compelled to do. Hence, audit 
quality might well differ by size of audit firm. 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
 
In relation to the impact of different sizes of audit firms on 
audit quality, a clear majority of oil companies and audit 
firms agreed that Big Four firms are superior to their non-
Big Four counterparts in all of the reputation issues 
presented to them, and that the size of the audit firm is 
positively associated with audit quality. 
Firstly, the questionnaire respondents concluded that 
Big Four audit firms are more attractive to investors and 
creditors because they are seen to provide reliable 
information that enables investors to properly assess risk 
and return profiles. Investors usually trust audit firms with 
a professional approach to auditing and a high level of 
audit quality. In the same manner, oil companies usually 
engage audit firms with a good reputation because they 
wish to enhance their own attractiveness to investors and 
creditors, and Big Four audit firms are considered to be 
better able to resist management pressure in conflict 
situations, thereby bringing enhanced credibility to any 
company that uses their auditing services. The Big Four 
auditors have greater resources, technical knowledge 
and global reach, which allows them to deal with clients 
more efficiently, and they are thus able to freely express 
their opinions without fear of their engagement being 
terminated by the client. In fact, Big Four audit firms may 
also exhibit higher levels of ethical reasoning and attract 
a greater variety of clients because of their appeal on 
quality grounds, and the associated benefits their repu-
tation brings. Indeed, as the Big Four audit firms have 
greater resources and possess technological capabilities, 
they can plan the audit process more effectively, perform 
more powerful tests, and be more likely to publish more 
precise information. 
Secondly, the majority of oil companies and audit firms 
agreed that Big Four audit firms are more risk averse and 
consequently, more disinclined to be associated with 
public scandals and/or audit failures than non-Big Four 
audit firms. These opinions might be an indication of the 
faith that the respondents still have in the ability and com-
petence of the Big Four to undertake their duties effect-
tively and professionally, despite the well-publicised audit 
failures involving large firms that have occurred in 
different economic, political, geographical and cultural 
settings, which may not be applicable to the Libyan audit 
market. It is possible that the invention of communication 
technology that allows business to be done in real-time 
has made the Big Four auditors more careful in 
conducting their business and more risk averse, with the 
result that their reluctance to be associated with any 
wrongdoings is enhanced, since the availability of such 
technology would result in faster spread of negative 
news. 
Finally, the majority of the respondents to the question-
naire recorded their belief that  Big  Four  audit  firms  are  
  
 
 
 
 
more independent than non-Big Four auditors. Indeed, 
the Big Four auditors are likely to become the subject of 
interest to the public and regulators, especially when they 
are suspected of exhibiting negative behaviour. Therefore, 
Big Four audit firms have more incentive to behave 
independently than non-Big Four audit firms. 
The results of the interview  survey revealed that  the 
perceived relationship between firm size and level of 
audit quality is consistent with the notion that higher audit 
quality is associated with foreign audit firms, in general. 
In this connection, the interviewees were of the opinion 
that the Big Four firms were more independent than their 
counterpart non-Big Four firms, and this was seen as a 
direct result of their size, since this provided them with 
more resources that in turn filtered through to organi-
sational practices, such as the provision of more training 
that ensures staff are skilled and effective in diagnosing 
activities that are inconsistent with a client’s going-
concern status. Such elements of organisational culture 
allow for the recruitment of more professionally-minded 
people, who subsequently provide a higher quality of 
service. It was felt by the interviewees that such high 
quality staff would naturally comply with international 
professional standards and work ethically, thereby being 
predisposed to resist management pressure. Overall, the 
Big Four firms were reported to be more powerful, 
effective and independent than the non-Big four firms, not 
least because after various accounting scandals and 
litigation concerning fraud and irregularities, they have 
more incentive to protect their reputation and continue 
with their high earnings. 
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